A new paper, "How Much Should Governments Pay To Prevent Catastrophes? Longtermism’s Limited Role," by Carl Shulman and Elliott Thornley, argues that governments should base catastrophe prevention policies on present-day cost-benefit analyses rather than solely on strong longtermist arguments. The paper, recently highlighted by prominent effective altruist William MacAskill on social media, contends that the traditional longtermist approach, which can imply extreme costs for current generations to mitigate future existential risks, is democratically unfeasible and unnecessary for effective policy.
Longtermism, a philosophical and ethical stance often associated with the effective altruism movement, posits that positively influencing the far future is a key moral priority. Strong longtermism, in particular, emphasizes that the potential for an astronomical number of future lives means even small reductions in existential risk can justify significant present-day sacrifices. This perspective often underpins calls for substantial investment in preventing global catastrophic risks like pandemics, nuclear war, or unaligned artificial intelligence.
However, Shulman, an advisor at Open Philanthropy, and Thornley, from the Global Priorities Institute at the University of Oxford, challenge the direct applicability of this strong longtermist reasoning to government policy. They assert that policies derived from such arguments, which might impose "extreme costs on the present generation for the sake of miniscule reductions in the risk of existential catastrophe," are unlikely to gain democratic acceptance. Instead, they propose that governments can justify increased action on catastrophic risks by focusing on the immediate, tangible benefits to current populations, such as preventing widespread death and societal collapse.
The paper suggests that a standard cost-benefit analysis, which incorporates the "altruistic willingness to pay" of citizens, provides a more democratically acceptable and equally effective framework for risk reduction. This approach avoids the perceived overreach of strong longtermism while still advocating for significant investment in preventing major disasters. The authors imply that longtermists engaging in policy advocacy should adjust their messaging to align with these more conventional economic and ethical frameworks.
The work contributes to an ongoing debate within the effective altruism community regarding the practical implications and public perception of longtermism. It suggests a pragmatic shift in how the imperative to prevent catastrophes can be framed to achieve greater political traction and societal buy-in, ensuring that vital risk mitigation efforts are pursued through democratically viable means.