New Legal Scholarship Advocates Formalist Clarity in Administrative Law's Law-Fact Divide

A new academic paper by legal scholar Haley Proctor, titled "Law and Fact in Administration," is drawing significant attention for its advocacy of a formalist approach to the long-debated law-fact distinction within administrative law. The paper, recently made available on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) and forthcoming in 2025, positions itself amidst the Supreme Court's evolving stance on the administrative state, aiming to provide a clearer framework for allocating decision-making authority between agencies and courts.

Haley Proctor, an Associate Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School starting Fall 2024, brings a robust background to this intricate area of legal theory. A graduate of Yale Law School, Proctor honed her understanding of constitutional and administrative law through clerkships with Justice Clarence Thomas at the U.S. Supreme Court and Judge Thomas B. Griffith of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Her prior work at the University of Missouri and in private practice at Cooper & Kirk, PLLC, further underscores her expertise in complex litigation and legal scholarship.

The paper has garnered an endorsement from prominent legal academic Ilan Wurman, the Julius E. Davis Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. Wurman, a respected voice in administrative law, separation of powers, and constitutionalism, including originalist interpretations, praised Proctor's work on social media. "Super interesting paper drop by Haley Proctor on the law-fact distinction in administrative law," Wurman stated in a tweet on August 23, 2025, urging others to "Get the paper here." His endorsement highlights the paper's relevance and potential impact within the legal community.

Proctor's "Law and Fact in Administration" delves into how the administrative state historically expanded under a "functionalist" understanding of the law-fact distinction, which prioritized practical considerations in assigning decision-making roles. She argues that this approach, rooted in legal realism, has become an "awkward tool" for the Supreme Court's more recent shift towards formalism. The paper identifies two primary approaches: a functionalist one, focused on institutional competence, and a formalist one, emphasizing strict adherence to constitutional allocations of power.

The core of Proctor's argument suggests that a renewed focus on a formalist approach, which more narrowly defines "law," can make the Court's current formalist trajectory more coherent and defensible. This builds upon her earlier work, "Rethinking Legislative Facts," published in the Notre Dame Law Review in 2024, where she explored the ambiguities of "legislative facts" and proposed integrating them more clearly within the adjudicatory process. The discussion holds significant implications for the level of deference courts grant to administrative agencies and the broader balance of power among governmental branches.